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Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the first analytical philoso-
phers who suggested the strategy of solving the communi-
cation problem. The communication as an exchange of 
meanings is supposed to have linguistic and extralinguistic 
aspects. The explanation of possibilities and conditions of 
the communication is connected with Wittgenstein’s 
concept “language-game”. To my mind the positive 
decision of the problem depends upon the definite scheme 
of interpretation of the language-games. The widespread 
version of the interpretation of this concept has some 
difficulties, which become more coherent in the social 
investigations. In this paper I intend to change the focus of 
interpretation of the language-games in order to avoid the 
evident paradox in settling of communication problem. 
The main peculiarity of the language-games, according 
to their critics (Apel, Habermas) is their autonomity, self-
sufficiency, and independence from each other. The 
language-game has its own horizon, which can be seen 
inside. The meaningfulness of using language expressions 
is established by the language-game’s horizon. The 
diversity of human activity generates the diversity of the 
language-games. The language-game functions according 
to its own strict rules. Such facts as knowing and pos-
sessing of the rules determine the possibility of the 
communication. The rules are grasped in the course of 
one’s training. The participants of the language-game don’t 
reflect its moves. They accept the game’s rules because 
they have been taught to act in such way. In the course of 
the game its participants don’t ask themselves the 
question why they act in such way.  
Thus according to such interpretation the language-
games are considered to be the autonomous systems of 
the communication isolated from each other. As a result 
the situation of translation between different language-
games becomes insoluble and/or problematical. The 
general theory of understanding is unnecessary, so that a 
separate case of understanding is established by 
individual language-game. It should be mentioned that 
such interpretation of the language-game loses its main 
peculiarity: each language-game – like the language as a 
whole – is an open system. We must remember Wittgen-
stein doesn’t say anywhere that language-games are the 
interpermeable entities. He never asserted that if we were 
taking part in one game then we would not be able to 
understand another person taking part in an absolutely 
different game. In contrast Wittgenstein underlines the 
diversity of practices in which each of us is engaged.  
If we come from the limits of the present interpretation 
then the necessary condition for the effective mutual 
understanding depends upon the communicators’ 
belonging to the same language-game. The verbal 
communication can be interpreted in the rules of the real 
language-game to a large extent so that each language 
expression interpreted by the game’s rules become 
meaningful for the native speakers of this language-game. 
I speak about the premises concerning the actual or the 
potential “states of affairs” which are interwoven in 
linguistic practice on the conceptual level. The conceptual 
presuppositions of language activity determine its semantic 
potential and hence the interpretative opportunities of the 
individuals taking part in definite language-game. So the 
effective mutual understanding can be realized only in the 
situation when the communicators have a shared 
conceptual background, that is they share common 
presuppositions concerning the states of affairs. It is 
supposed that in case the native speakers share different 
conceptual premises the opportunity of any communication 
among them is questioned. Hence the communicators 
need to be participants of the same language-game to 
reach the mutual understanding.  
However for Wittgenstein a linguistic behaviour is one’s 
ability to actualize the language in the different language-
games. Moreover we operate with words and “in the 
course of time turn them sometimes into one picture, 
sometimes into another”(Wittgenstein 1953, 131 § 449).  
I think the supposed interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
concept will not give us a satisfactory explanation how we 
master the new language. Wittgenstein’s researchers 
reduce a speech activity to operating of the definite set of 
reactions to the signs. They assume as a basis of each 
linguistic practice a certain set of correspondences 
between the words and one’s reactions to them. However 
it is asserted that a new reaction (or new speech behav-
iour) into the habitual word is impossible, because the 
breach of rules of the language-game means its ending. 
Such way of understanding the linguistic behaviour is 
determined by rule following implicitly contained in our 
language. The rules of any type of the language fix the 
appointed native speakers’ behaviour. Hence the learning 
of the new rules by speakers is located out from their 
linguistic competence. Such model of understanding of the 
game’s rules could not advance the process of predicting 
the future linguistic behaviour. But according to Wittgen-
stein the language-games are not stable: the new types of 
language arise, other become obsolete, they may be 
forgotten and change their character (PI § 23).  
My principle hypothesis is the following: the impossibility 
to explain the communication phenomenon consists in 
attributing ontological status to the language-games. The 
conceptual sovereignty of the language-games is the 
result of their ontological understanding. An ontological 
feature of the language-game determines the impossibility 
of the dialogue between various languages practices. If we 
regard the language-game not as different aspects of the 
same language but as the different languages then any 
attempt to translate from one language to another leads to 
the loss of its specific content that can be expressed by 
our own language. I try to present another interpretative 
version of Wittgenstein’s concept of the language-game. I 
think it is more correct and it allows coming up to the 
explanation of the possibility effective communication more 
fruitfully.  
If we use the language-game metaphor to designate the 
numerous aspects (or models) of the speech activity (not 
as given ontological structures determining the referential 
opportunities of the native speakers of the language) then 
we may find the productivity of Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
investigations helping to solve the problem of understand-
ing. It is not of great interest to pronounce the language as 
mosaic of the precise outlined linguistic practices when we 




try to grasp the ways of existence of the native language. It 
means the lack of communication problem.  
The language game is a system of operating rules, 
which determines the functions of linguistic signs through 
the applications of these rules (PI § 559). The totality of 
the language games constitutes the form of life. The 
concept of a language-game is one aspect of the idea that 
the meaning of words and expressions is found in their 
use. Wittgenstein emphasizes on the multifarious ways in 
which words are used, and on the importance of consid-
ering the context in which a word is used in order to 
understand its meaning. Wittgenstein likens language to 
the tools in a toolbox, and the functions of words to the 
functions of these objects. That is, we do many different 
things with words, and in coming to see how they work we 
come to understand their meaning (PI § 11).  
A language-game is a rule-governed activity, and to play 
such a game is to engage in a social practice. That 
language-games are governed by rules means that we can 
distinguish between right and wrong moves in the game. 
That is, there is an external check on what we do, playing 
the game; it is possible for others to correct us if we apply 
a word against the rules of a particular game. But this does 
not mean that the rule of the game is always explicit; nor 
that a person who takes part in the game is always able to 
formulate them when questioned. But in playing the game 
we do not normally think of the rules; nor do we normally 
learn language-games by being taught the rules. The 
game’s rules existence beforehand a person is going to 
take part in the language-game. When the language-game 
was created the process of the game and its rules are 
formed simultaneously. Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of 
the stream and its channel.  
The function of the language-game consists in elucidat-
ing the word-usage in problematic situations. We can 
compare the speech activity with a stream of continuous 
situations in the context of which the speaker needs to 
make the choice of the definite semantic version of the 
language. And the speaker has orientated already towards 
definite model of the language-game. We may qualify such 
versions as semantic quantity, which help to explain the 
possibility of the speech varying when we use the native 
language with diverse intentions and by diverse ways. In 
speaking of language-games we are brought to consider 
the contexts in which words and expressions have their 
life; where we see them, functioning as they do in a 
network of other words and expressions and actions. If we 
consider the context in which, say, an order is issued and 
ask ourselves how we know this was an order, we realize 
that the words and actions of this language-game, as of 
others, are interwoven. We must remember that the ways 
of using the signs are not determined by the “concept”. On 
the contrary our concepts are the generalizations of the 
diverse usage of the same signs. Wittgenstein has 
understood the language-game as the practice, the 
institute, and the form of life. The research of the lan-
guage-game is an investigation of the primitive linguistic 
forms. It may be said about the hierarchy of the games’ 
system. Wittgenstein’s presupposition consisted in 
clarifying the genealogy of the language-games, and so to 
disclose their practical significance.  
Sings and their rules are not isolated entities working by 
themselves, but operations in human behaviour (PI § 454). 
For Wittgenstein the meaning of singular words is 
determined only in the context of prepositional moves in 
the language game, and thus it is from the sense of a 
proposition that the meanings of its component words are 
understood (PI §49, 138). Thus our linguistic ability 
includes knowledge of these meaning structures. Meaning 
structures are connected with words as combined in a 
proposition applied by living human beings (PI § 454). 
Nevertheless, one cannot perform a propositional move in 
a language game without “knowing” the meaning rules of 
the proposition’s component words. The selection of the 
relevant meaning structure of a word from a cluster of such 
structures for a proposition depends upon the purpose of 
the propositional move in a particular language game. 
Unfortunately, this “knowledge” and the selecting mecha-
nism remain enigmatic since they remain outside the realm 
of Wittgenstein’s interest in his late philosophy of lan-
guage. In this way, however, we can understand, 
according to Wittgenstein, the dependence relation 
between the sense of the proposition and the meaning of 
its words. Nevertheless, it seems that we should go further 
and make a distinction between the speaker and the 
hearer in ordinary communicational use of language in this 
regard. For the speaker, this relation is not reflexive, since 
he cannot determine the sense of his intended preposi-
tional move from the clusters of meanings of its component 
words. But for the hearer and the learner of language 
games, the relation between the sense of the proposition 
and the meaning of its component words must be different 
(PI #54). Here the person first grasps of the component 
words, and through them understands the sense of the 
proposition in the context of its use. We should remember 
that words have clusters that have of senses, which 
determine their distinct meanings and therefore their 
different uses in the language games (Nesher 60). 
By means of such interpretation of the language game it 
is possible to explain the situations of meaningful usage of 
the same language in various contexts. The natural 
language doesn’t differentiate into the language-games. 
The language-games are the explanatory hypotheses 
simulating our real language behaviour. They haven’t their 
own ontological status. The language-game’s rules don’t 
exhaust the properties and the possibilities of the actual 
word-usage. For Wittgenstein “no course of action could 
be determined by a rule, because every course of action 
can be made to accord with the rule” (PI § 201). It means 
the hypothetical character of each rule. According to 
Wittgenstein the rules are not complete and need to be 
supported by practice constantly. Rules’ indefiniteness and 
their possibility of new usage in practice make the rules 
viability. The rule is a product of training. But people can 
use it differently. The method of training based on principle 
“do like I” is variable and it is supposed by the private 
application. It’s precisely that the practice determines what 
the “rule-following” is right or wrong. But the recognition of 
the private application of the rule is realized by common 
agreement. The using of any rule is dependent on situation 
and how the communicators understand this situation. The 
variation of invariable or the usage of the rule makes the 
language-game an open system. The human behaviour is 
an intelligent usage of the rules. But one’s “intelligence” 
consists in his skill to repeat or to use a rule in any new 
situations, not in his reflection.  
The rules of the language-game can be interpreted as 
one’s suppositions about reference intentions of other 
native speakers of the language. These suppositions are 
propounded in order to find the definite semantic regulari-
ties of the speakers’ behaviour and then to predict their 
future linguistic acts. These suppositions may or not come 
up one’s expectations. In last case a person makes other 
suppositions, which are radically different from the former. 
The natural language’s rules differ from the rules of the 
artificial language because the last has the strict estab-
lished rules. The rules of the language game connect 




linguistic expressions with extralinguistic aids: objects, 
samples, activities, etc. The extralinguistic components of 
language games are, in the first place, the criteria for the 
meaning of the linguistics components. They become such 
meaning criteria only in the learning of grammatical rules. 
The conspicuous characteristic of the grammatical rules is 
that they determine the internal relations constituting the 
grammar of the language game. These relations are the 
norms of meaning that we learn and apply in our linguistic 
game. These relations are the norms of meaning that we 
learn and apply in our linguistic behaviour. Thus, the 
applications of grammatical rules are the use of related 
linguistic expressions (Nesher 55). 
The rules of the “depth” grammar would not be able 
codified in principle (PI § 84). Our speech activity does not 
disintegrate into the multitude (secluded) fragments of the 
language. The contrary we like the native speakers have 
the power to realize the language in different ways and 
with different intentions. This power is our skill to orientate 
the language behaviour towards one or another model of 
the language-game. We can use such mode of under-
standing the language-games to clarify the manipulative 
function of the language. The specific oriented activity is 
one’s language manipulating. The manipulating by the 
language is realized in one’s skills to use the diverse 
combinations of the sentences. We should demonstrate 
our power to adapt the language to the new situations and 
the contexts, to put the schemes on the content of our 
experience. Such linguistic creation is the basic condition 
for any communication. If the individuals conduct them-
selves orientating into the diverse models of the speech 
activity then the main condition of the effective mutual 
understanding would be their ability to reach the common 
code of the communication. Thus the semantic compe-
tence of the native speakers of the language is not limited 
by the language-game. The contrary they’re operating by 
the language and it allows them to overcome the limits of 
their actual linguistic experience and to find “common 
language” even in the case when the communicators 
belong to the different forms of life. Wittgenstein speaks of 
the common behaviour of mankind in the Investigations: 
“The common behaviour of mankind is the system of 
reference by means of which we interpret an unknown 
language” (PI §206). 
Consequently if we regard the Wittgenstein’s concept 
“language-game” as ontological matter then we narrow 
and even make impossible to solve the problem of 
communication. The communication is explained if we 
consider the language-games as mental (theoretical) 
constructions, or as a special way of experimenting with 
language mentally.  
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